Posts tagged "philosophy":
The End of History.
Introduction
Francis Fukuyama is probably the person most connected to the concept of “the End of History”, but he is not the originator of it. Fukuyama’s initial article (that was then later expanded upon to the book The End of History and the Last Man) initially reads as a summary of the Kojévian interpretation of Hegel’s observation of the end of History. Fukuyama sees in the collapse of the Soviet order in eastern Europe as not just a victory of western liberal democracy, but as a showcase of this western system as the ultimate goal of human society entirely. This view of History ending seems to have been thoroughly debunked in our popular consciousness, to the point of simply naming the concept in my international relations class elicits chuckles across the lecture hall, and academic scholars praise Finland for “never [believing] that history ended in 1989”1. I have not read Fukuyama’s larger coverage of his thinking on this subject, only his initial article titled The End of History? as well as the original sources of Hegel’s Phenomenology and Kojéve’s lectures on it. In some regards Fukuyama has already faced much of this criticism preëmtively2, but somehow misconceptions still abound. I agree wholeheartedly with Kojéve’s experience:
Observing what was taking place around me and reflecting on what had taken place in the world since the Battle of Jena, I understood that Hegel was right to see in this battle the end of History properly so-called.
I have written this text both to convince the readers that this is the case, but also to work through my own thinking on the topic. I will try and cover some major events and areas of the world who one might see as counterexamples of the thesis. But first we must make clear what History is and is not.
What is meant by the End of History?
History seems quite straightforward as to its definition, most in the western world had it as a subject for several years and so think they have a through understanding of the term. When seen through this lens it is mostly defined as the study and documenting of events in the past and perhaps on how they influence the future. But in the Hegelian sense history is more so seen as the trajectory of human consciousness toward absolute knowledge and self-consciousness. I am not surprised that most people, even academic scholars and subject-matter experts, misunderstand this point — Hegel is not very widely read and his concepts are mostly known through the interpretation of others. The end of history appears when this absolute knowledge is realized and actualized in the geist of the world. In Hegel’s view the trajectory this first took was through the Greeks, Christianity, Lutheran Protestantism, the French Revolution, and finally described at Jena by Hegel as Bonaparte marched through it3. Napoleon and the society he represented was however merely the vanguard of world-history, and there was of course still the work of implementing it. This will likely take the appearance of the graph for the function \(f(x) = 1 - \frac{1}{x}\), with the world in a continual process to reach historical culmination. But this still does not mean that authentic historical action is possible, it would merely be bringing the other parts of the world in line with the most developed historical position; it is an extension of width rather than in depth. Post-historical society is one in which the economic activities of man are most prominent, rather than the drama and spectacle of struggle and war. As such it can not be preöccupied with conflict with other post-historical regions; it is bad for business after all. Society revolves entirely around the ideas of maintaining humanity’s happiness. This should not be misconstrued as a regretful development — a lack of suffering and pain in the world is a noble goal. But it is the reality that we no longer have anything to strive toward beyond hedonistic happiness that defines post-historical man. Things such as the impending crisis of climate change is nothing more than a threat to our way of life, and a threat of such a nature is the greatest threat post-historical society can face.
History then did not end in 1989, and it is with that I agree with the critics of Fukuyama. Instead in ended almost 200 years earlier, in 1806, when the ideas and processes that create the final shape of society were first identified. When one makes this claim it becomes obvious how laughable counterarguments of “well why did the Ukraine war happen if history ended?” when events like the first and second world wars are both seen as entirely post-historical, even by people who lived through them like Kojéve himself. Events of large material importance can (and indeed must) occur, and a country does not have to deny the end of history to maintain a large military force. But this force is oriented principally externally toward those regions of the world where society has not reached the same level of historical development, whether that be North America in 1812, Eastern Europe during the cold war, Iraq in 2003, or the Russian Federation today. Those societies already firmly established within the post-historical framework are no longer a threat to other post-historical societies. The strange phenomenon of the democratic peace may very well have its solution in this perspective, where the Stewartian definition4 of democratic or elective states can fully replaced with those regions of the world where history has ended.
According to Kojéve society in a post-historical time is structured through “the universal homogeneous state”. What this state looks like differs depending on one’s interpretation, but all of the major illustrations of such a state5 are fundamentally attempts to impose what is strictly a philosophical identity on to an empirical political reality. But what seems to have occurred is rather distinct from this, our philosophical development has occurred not in parallel with political development but entirely separately. It remains unclear if political development will in time “catch up” with our popular consciousness, as with how the ideas of the enlightenment spurred political development in 1848 and continue to underpin contemporary events, or if this combination of philosophy and politics are fundamentally still compatible. The largest crack in this status quo that I perceive is arguably the environmental movement (and its reactionary counterpart) if any.
I should make clear that I disagree with Fukuyama’s view of a liberal, democratic, free-market west as the uniquely final historical position. Although there is a clear correlation between the post-historical regions and these qualities one should not mistake the sale of ice cream as the cause of drowning. Instead this universal homogeneous state exists not as a state as used within the context of international relations, a political unit with a defined territory and nominal sovereignty over it, but a state as in a state of affairs. The universal homogeneous state is a shared lived experience and way of thinking about the world around one self6. It is especially prevalent on the banks of the northern Atlantic ocean, in Japan, South Korea, and Oceania, regions of the world uncontroversially seen as part of Fukuyama’s post-historical world. But it is equally present in regions such as Shanghai, Moscow, Cape Town, and São Paulo. The reverse is also true. The United States for example has many areas that are not part of this post-historical world, even though the US as a whole is firmly post-historical in nature (the case is also true for much of Europe). One can draw a rural-urban divide here, but that would still not be entirely correct — many urban areas still have not reached the end of history, and many rural areas have — but one would likely still see a strong correlation. Why urban life creates the conditions for post-historical man I will not describe here, but will cover at a later time.
It is however the case that this state is not merely a fixed set of philosophical conditions paused in time. Keeping in line with Hegel the self-consciousness of the individual is distinctly created in opposition to the other7, and is in a continuos process of recreation (in both the literal and figurative senses of the word) that characterises post-historical society. The inter-subjective forum where this process takes place is the internet. Most of the computer’s major impact has been not in the fields of mass-manufacturing or administration, but in the spread of ideas and media’s increased intensity and presence within our daily lives. It is this shared experience of mankind’s manifestation in the digital realm that bind’s the world’s populations into a single coherent whole; into a homogenous state of being. Preceding digital computers the homogenous state was of course still present, through the shared human experiences and means of communication of earlier times. But this was broadened — binding more and more of the world’s population, space, and time into it — by the telegraph and the transistor.
The end of history is then not the achievement of any set of material conditions (the absence of war and hunger) nor is it the culmination of political development throughout time. It is the philosophical realization of a given identity, of a set of values, and an understanding in self-consciousnesses on the scale of humanity as a whole. We will now chart the current state of this weltgiest as it appears to us in the first half of this decade. To begin we will cover the grand expanse to the east of the European subcontinent.
Russia
We begin with Russia not just because it is, here in Sweden and in Europe as a whole, seen as the unmaking of what they see as the greatest achievement of the post-historical world: the long European Peace since 1945. But, as we have already covered, post-historicity does not mean the end of wars, the redrawing of borders, or of major historical events. In fact, conflict must occur while there are still parts of the world who have not reached the end of history. Russia feels provoked into action and therefore must act. It is a state that is so developed that the state encompasses all — this is nationalism — but it has yet to achieve the contradiction between the state and the individual. It is this key change that Napoleon embodied, and so it is not impossible to do through authoritarianism, but it may also require democratic reform. Until then the state is what will drive historical development, pure economic growth or citizen movements will be unable to act in this environment. It is then this feeling that the Russian state has (or is at least interpreted and anthropomorphized as having) that makes this interesting from a philosophical point of view, that drives its foreign policy goals.
But this is not a mere conflict over Russian sovereignty in its “near-abroad”. In Russia this is framed in civilizational terms, where the Russian civilization is distinct from the western-European one, just as the Chinese or Hindu one is. This means that Russia must identify itself in contrast to the rest of Europe. It still gains its identity from its relationship to the other and can not maintain a disparate identity that makes peaceful relations possible. It must see itself as in conflict with the other as long as it is still a master in the framework of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. The collapse of the USSR was a humbling of the Russian civilization within these terms, but it was not defeated in the sense that it surrendered out of a genuine fear for death. This fear is what drives the continually conflict-prone master to become a slave, and it is only the slave who is capable of fully realizing her self-consciousnesses and progress history. Russian aggression must therefore occur before it reaches historical fulfilment, it is still a master in search of another master that can recognize it. But it is not merely enough for Russia to back down against the west of Europe, is must feel a genuine dread throughout its nation. But this is also not something that can be imposed from abroad. Franco-German tanks rolling across the Red Square will strike fear into the hearts of Russians yes, they may become even more bellicose and struggle for revenge. Instead it is a feeling and historical process that must come from within. The Russian consciousness must be transformed by their own volition to be of this nature, just as what happened in most of the Soviet satellite states after the cold war.
This is not a process that one can expect to come quickly, but it is at the same time hard to say if it will take a long time. It will occur gradually, and then suddenly. Until then Europe, and the rest of Russia’s neighbours, should be prepared for conflict with it. It is not a contradiction of post-historicity that Finland should arm itself for war with its much larger possibly belligerent neighbour; as long as that neighbour is itself not another post-historical state.
The United States of America
The second major development seen by many as a counterexample against the end of history are the developments in the United States of America; more specifically the election of Donald Trump. But the question that needs to be asked is what Trump’s behaviour is actually symptomatic of. He has threatened annexation of post-historical allies such as Canada and Greenland; does this not show how the assumption that post-historical states do not have to protect themselves against others of their kind is wrong? But remember, the nature of history is not of a political nature, but of a philosophical one. Does Trump have any ideological or idealist qua idea motive for his actions that contradict those of the rest of the world? I do not think he does. He of course utilizes different techniques to achieve his aims, and may desire power for power’s sake, but these are not in and of themselves a goal. Really Trump has the same goal as the rest of us, the maintenance humanity’s happiness. He may fail at doing so for a multitude of reasons, but it does not mean that he is in a America is in a conflict (in the philosophical sense) with Europe or Canada, just as the US was not in conflict with the UK and France in 1956 despite actively undermining them and the presence of hostile rhetoric between the two camps.
Trumpist America lacks an ideological driving force of what the world should look like and is therefore incapable of historical action. It leaves the individual in the same position as liberalism, as the citizen entirely involved in, and yet at the same time wholly separated from, the state. MAGA is pure populism, and in many ways itself an example of post-historicity. It is the juxtaposition of the individual against the other, against a nebulous grouping of the woke. The individual is seen as simultaneously part of the greater whole in a collective labour to improve society, but at the same time promoting the ideals individualism and freedom and a hatred toward those opposed to the Trumpian project, whatever it may be. Trump’s authoritarian tendencies also do not discredit the thesis; the very vanguard of history was originally realized through Napoleon Bonaparte, a populist general who performed a military coup and whose rule was by no means democratic.
The developments in America then do not conflict with the end of history, they are merely another manifestation of its predicted behaviour, and in some ways even a strong example of the thesis itself. Exactly what the nature of authoritarianism and fascism is in the post-historical environment I will not endeavour to explain here however.
The People’s Republic of China
I hope that it has become clear that while I disagree with Fukuyama’s critics on the basic reading of him (or lack thereof) I am also not a clear-cut supporter of his ideas, especially in their most popular form. In an interview with Foreign Affairs Fukuyama has stated that the “single” counterexample to the end of history is the rise of the People’s Republic of China, and the level of economic growth and prosperity it has achieved while under the auspices of a socialist one-party state. But there are two main factors that have allowed this apparent contradiction to flourish: the fact that Fukuyama is wrong about the need for liberal democracy to build a prosperous economy and the fact that the CCP has adopted the very strategies proven to be successful in the west.
What causes economic growth is a question that is not easy to answer, if it was then every country would do it. But there are general assumptions to be made through correlation that allows us to see this from an interesting point of view. Since the beginning of the industrial revolution every school of economics has had to make its argument for why it occurred. It was such an explosion in economic growth and activity compared to pre-historical times that nothing in human history has had a similar impact on the condition of the human population — and the rest of the living species in the world. Trying to contend these intellectual giants is then an incredible feat of hubris, and I shall not seriously argue that a question of such magnitude can be answered easily. Nevertheless I believe that there is a generally impactful variable in stability. My ideas on this topic are heavily influenced from listening to the recipients of the 2024 Nobel prize in economic sciences8. In this line of thinking, stability (both in the form of a lack of conflict and in an awareness in how things are done) are hugely important in determining the levels of prosperity in a country. In this manner democratic states are not only wealthier because some of them have had a history of colonial exploitation, but also because democracy inherently has rules and regulations and tries to punish those who break them in predictable ways. A philosopher king who rules by decree, no matter how benevolent or skilful, may change either his mind or “the rules of the game” abruptly, bringing a sense of insecurity into any venture. What Fukuyama calls China’s “institutionalized autocracy” brings this factor into play in China. Since there was no absolute ruler, only the nebulous institution of “the party”, change could not occur at the whims of any particular person, and so companies and individuals could trust that they could foresee or understand changes made. This is the stability necessary for a market economy to work efficiently, even if the “rules of the game” as set are flawed and imperfect. Changing them should still be done of course, but predictably, transparently, and accountably. It is in manner that economic successes can be explained independently from liberal democracy or their ideals, such as the formal rule of law. As long as things occur as people expect they do, they can continue doing business.
But the key is that China has adopted a market-economy, albeit perhaps of a dirigiste kind. This is in line with the idea concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics, where China’s largely rural, poor, and agricultural society would/is not capable of attaining socialism and communism, largely a return to orthodox pre-soviet Marxist thought where the origin of revolution would be in the industrial heart of the world economy; in Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. What the CCP is doing is then not contradictory in the slightest according to ideology, it is only wrong to call it socialism. But this is mere pandering to ideologues, in reality I do not believe the CCP leadership has any intention of returning to the socialist policies preceding Deng Xiaoping. Mark Fisher was correct in observing the stagnation in politics following the collapse of Soviet empire in Capitalist Realism, with the introductory chapter famously using the Žižekian/Jamesonian quote of “it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism”. Capitalist theory and practices have become so engrained in the consciousness of the world that it is no longer possible to move to another alternative9.
Both ideologically and economically China has become allied with the west, but China is in many ways post-historical in its philosophical sense as well. I intend to examine both the extent and nature of this more carefully when travelling to the PRC later this year, but Chinese society is equally perpetuated in the hedonistic joy of society. This is of great trouble for the CCP, whose ideology is based on a continued struggle toward communism. Instead of caring about the historical development of the proletariat the Chinese population is troubled with post-historical issues. They wish for stable iron-rice-bowl jobs, fleeting consumer goods, and the ever-continuing flow of entertainment supplied by services like Douyin. Life becomes a hedonistic maintenance of happiness and joy, just as it has become in the other post-historical regions of the world like Europe and Japan.
Conclusion
My hope is that this has been an illuminating coverage of some of the main criticisms of the end of history, and that I have dispelled any notions of history “restarting” or that we have merely been on a “holiday” from history since 1989, with the so-called holiday ending either in 2001 or more recently. If you have any other major counterexamples I would be glad to hear them, since many of these major ones I have here covered are quite elementary — with the major issues merely being a gross misunderstanding of what is being discussed. I shall end with a quote by Kojéve that showcases the nature of post-historical society:
It is precisely to the organization and the ‘humanization’ of its free time that future humanity will have to devote its efforts. (Did Marx himself not say, in repeating, without realizing it, a saying of Aristotle’s: that the ultimate motive of progress, and thus of socialism, is the desire to ensure a maximum of leisure for man?)
Footnotes:
Stéfanie von Hlatky and Michel Fortmann, “NATO Enlargement and the Failure of the Cooperative Security Mindset,” in Evaluating NATO Enlargement (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), 546.
As early as the introductory paragraph of his article Fukuyama states:
The past year has seen a flood of articles commemorating the end of the Cold War, and the fact that “peace” seems to be breaking out in many regions of the world. […] If Mr. Gorbachev were ousted from the Kremlin or a new Ayatollah proclaimed the millennium from a desolate Middle Eastern capital, these same commentators would scramble to announce the rebirth of a new era of conflict.
Is this not what is happening at the moment? There is of course a new era of conflict, but does that mean that the historical processes playing out over time are not there?
I can’t define it but I know it when I see it.
For the right-Hegelians it is the rigid authoritarianism and pietism of the “Prussian virtues” that takes this place, for the left-Hegelians the classlessness of communism, and for Fukuyama the liberal world order.
And in the Hegelian sense thinking can not be disentangled from action.
From the Phenomenology:
[…] in fact self-consciousness is the reflection out of the Being of the sensory and perceived world, and essentially the return from otherness.
That being Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. I am aware they did not technically receive a Nobel prize, but instead the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, but find the distinction unnecessary.
This is of course a consequence of Ellulian technique, but I shall not explain the subject further here.
The Philosophical Impacts of Nuclear Weapons
Similarly to this earlier post, this was written as an examination at the Swedish Defence University. It was written for the course Nuclear Weapons in International Security and as such is also available as a .pdf
here.
To answer the question of whether or not the invention nuclear bomb has been the most important event of human history is not an easy task. There are certainly numerous arguments in favour of such a statement; nuclear weapons have given us the thermodynamically most efficient form of releasing energy yet devised; they have given us the ability to quickly and easily destroy the major feats of our ancestors and possibly even those of our descendents; they have given us power beyond humanity’s comprehension. And yet the nature of a question of this broad a nature requires us to think more deeply about technological evolution and of our place within it. What constitutes an invention, and what makes certain inventions more important than others? Have the impacts of nuclear weapons, on both our materialist world and the cultural spiritus mundi, been large enough to warrant such a description? The Manhattan Project, despite its tremendous success from seemingly out of nowhere, was not a gift of Prometheus. The project itself was an industrial effort of incredible proportions, and built upon the recent cumulative advances in nuclear physics, quantum mechanics, and special relativity. It is therefore difficult to see the invention of nuclear weapons as a being a particularly important event from the left-handed qua limit perspective, while for those looking in from a right-handed perspective may see the Trinity test as a defining point in human history, especially given the role in the popular consciousness nuclear weapons were given during the cold war.
Nuclear weapons are fundamentally a tool for destruction. The term often used, the bomb, signifies its place as the ultimate explosive, whose Ding an sich is destructive potential in the extreme. They are the ultimate tool of our modern industrial society when organised for murder. It allows for the quick, easy, efficient, and large-scale genocide of the human race. It is hardly necessary to produce a bigger explosive, only delivery systems can be improved. The power to destroy has been concentrated as much as it ever could. The fate of all mankind is now concentrated in one decision, made by one man1. And yet the technology and industry involved is enormous. There are right now 21702 sailors dedicated to staffing American nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines, spending great lengths of time under the waves ready to strike at any moment. Airbases are filled with pilots and planes ready to be armed, and a massive system of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch bunkers wait in silence. All this is then supplied and organised, and an enormous technological machine is used to communicate relay information between them and the President of the United States. Can the individual sailor, pilot, telecom operator, truck driver, or taxpayer feel any remorse over their part in this system of death? Not even the person most clearly responsible can, as Truman, the only man who has ever ordered nuclear weapons to be used on a fellow man, supposedly did not have any ’pangs of conscience’ in the slightest3. Each person involved has become alienated from the act of mass murder.
The subject that drives this development is that of technique, strictly different from that of technology. Jacques Ellul dedicates an entire chapter of his work La Technique ou l’Enjeu du siècle to trying to accurately define technique, and so summarising it here is difficult. But Ellul later uses a quote he sees as symptomatic of technique related to nuclear weapons.
We may quote here Jacques Soustelle’s well-known remark of May, 1960, in reference to the atomic bomb. It expresses the deep feeling of us all: “Since it was possible, it was necessary.” Really a master phrase for all technical evolution.4
Nuclear weapons were a logical next step after the discovery of nuclear fission and of its possibility for chain reactions. The scientific and engineering challenges that had to be overcome for the peaceful use nuclear fission were very similar to those involved in the creation of an explosive device5 (Perhaps with the exception of the development of exploding-bridgewire detonators for implosion-type weapons). The linear idea of progress toward efficiency means that a power source as efficient qua thermodynamics as the exploitation of the weak force was inevitable as a solution. Since it was possible, it was necessary.
But technique does not rest, it is ever expanding. The problems that followed the invention of the atomic bomb were not yet of a truly existential nature. While nuclear weapons were incredibly effective, they could still be reasonably defended against through the maintenance of air-superiority, and the requirements of large amounts of fissile material meant that they remained a scare tool. Ideas of nuclear weapons as simply more efficient bombs were not unheard of within the U.S. military establishment6. But the development of the thermonuclear bomb, with its orders of magnitude larger explosive potential and much smaller costs, created a true technical crisis. These fusion devices, placed atop ICBMs, allowed for the large-scale killing of entire nation states and continents. But more importantly, they were practically impossible to defend against. You no longer had to defeat your opponent militarily in order to coerce your opponent’s civilian population7. War became totally disconnected from both industrial capacity and military techniques. It also became possible for your opponent to strike back after you had launched your nuclear weapons, bringing both sides to a quick and grisly demise. To use the to use the terminology of Bueno de Mesquita8, nuclear weapons had destroyed the hope of any expected-utility that could be gained in any war involving them. This problem of course meant that the only rational use of nuclear weapons was to not employ9 them in a deadly conflict.
The invention of arms control is a technical invention to do nothing. The rational answer to the inquiry of nuclear weapons is to never detonate them, as in doing so the threat behind them becomes useless. But the industrial nations that have developed nuclear weapons — as well as the systems to maintain employment and constant readiness — can not readily give them up, only reduce their number. The answer to the self-inflicted problem of the uncontrolled nuclear arms race is then another solution, that of arms control. But this causes more problems; how to ensure compliance, the labour and organisation for monitoring stockpiles et cetera. A reason for the failure of the “five recognized nuclear weapon states” in fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and also the reason that the non-nuclear states do not feel betrayed over the nuclear armed states’ failure at disarmament may be that they themselves would feel pressured to keep their nuclear weapons had they possessed them. Why South Africa did give up its weapons was because it did so through technique. South Africa did not leave its nuclear weapons program in disrepair, but decided to decisively rid itself of its limited number of weapons in exchange for improvement of international relations and prestige. The technical use of nuclear weapons were in this case their destruction not in explosive form, but in dismantlement.
Carol Cohn has described her experience with what she has christened as technostrategic thinking by defence intellectuals regarding nuclear strategy. She sees it as “based on a kind of thinking, a way of looking at problems — formal, mathematical modeling, systems analysis, game theory, linear programming — that are part of technology itself”10. This line of thinking that Cohn identifies is not unique to the study of nuclear strategy, but is present in nearly every field today. Every example of this form of thought she mentions is a form of pure logical and theoretical reasoning, perhaps the purest example of a form of action driven by technique. Everywhere in our modern society there is a movement toward formal rational thinking that serves to effectivize all aspects of life and society, but perhaps most clearly the trio of land, labour, and capital. The specialized language Chon describes that acts as a barrier against uninformed opinions and outside criticism10 is also a symptom of technique. Each sector of life becomes increasingly obtuse and specialized, to the point of being totally enigmatic to an outsider to the field. The terminology used by defence strategists (Reëntry vehicles, countervalue, exchanging warheads et cetera) are of course descriptors of specific things (Not all vehicles exit the atmosphere and so only some reënter, countervalue contra counterforce, a mutual attack) but they also serve as a way to shape discussions qua Sapir-Whorf. There is of course no malicious intent behind this; it is merely the consequences of an increasingly technical field. Abstractions necessarily increase when detail increases, and so the expert is removed from the subject matter in some sense, the nuclear strategist no longer thinks of the horrors of nuclear war, of searing flesh and silently deadly radiation, but instead sees the subject through the eyes of countervalue, acceptable casualties, and mutually assured destruction. This is why those advocating for the total abolition of nuclear weapons are seen as malinformed activists, rather than subject matter experts. Because in some sense, they are. Becoming one of “them” requires adopting this language, and therefore the technostrategic thinking as Cohn also realizes.
Is there then no hope of stopping this technical development? It the only choice a nihilistic submission to its whims? This is not a particularly strange conclusion; technique is an inherently alienating force that removes meaning from not just our actions, but even our very lives themselves. What is the point in living on if your only accomplishment would be the continued advancement of an unsaid structure of society to which there is no alternative? Nietzsche was right in asking “Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?” in reference to our murder of God. Humanity needed to take God’s place because God did not give meaning to our lives any more. Instead the goal, the temple of human society, would be this tower of Babel. We would become masters of the physical world; “nothing that they propose to do will now be impossible for them”11. We set out to control our surroundings absolutely, and through technique we had no choice but to do so. If technique is superhumanly powerful and leaves us no agency in human development it may be easy to fall into nihilistic lines of reasoning. But nihilism is inherently unstable, since according to Kojève the nihilist
[…] disappears by committing suicide, he ceases to be, and consequently he ceases to be a human being, an agent of historical evolution.12
Kojève is not alone in this line of reasoning. Camus also agrees with this idea of the nihilist only having suicide as a true course of action13. In this void created by nihilism, existentialism finds its home. If we are genuine free beings we do have an ability to rid of our nuclear weapons, and every day choose not to. This then would be a source of existentialist angst over nuclear weapons, we do not only feel anxious over our possible demise due to their employment, but also over our moral failures at global disarmament.
The foundations of deterrence theory shares some similarities to the Kojève’s interpretation12 of Hegel’s Master-Slave dialectic14 where the masters (in this case the nuclear powers) fight for self recognition by competing in a struggle with other masters. Nuclear-armed nations joust in a game of brinkmanship, needing the other to back down. This is necessarily a fight to the death for self-consciousness. However, if both parties refuse to back down and annihilate each other that is clearly a loss for both sides. And in the other alternative of one side dominating the other absolutely and killing them, there is no one left to recognize the victor for what he has done. In other words, if there are two Americans and zero Russians left alive, we lose15. To achieve recognition one of the parties must necessarily back down and recognize the master as human, and become the slave. But as the master then stops recognizing the slave as human, he looks onward to other masters whom he sees as worthy of loving him. This constant cycle of struggle for the master is what causes stability on different levels within the nuclear system (U.S.-Russia, India-Pakistan, India-China). Neither side is willing to back down because they require this prestige to continue to legitimise their existence as nation-states.
This dynamic underscores the paradoxical stability created by mutual recognition of the destructive potential inherent in nuclear deterrence. The system persists not because it ensures peace, but because it creates a deliberately uneasy equilibrium16. As each nuclear power seeks to maintain its position as a “master,” it must engage in a delicate dance of demonstrating strength without triggering catastrophic escalation and risking destruction of the enemy it wishes to dominate. The recognition of mutual vulnerability — the “balance of terror” — forces adversaries into a perpetual state of brinkmanship, where neither side can afford to appear weak nor escalate beyond the point of no return. In this sense, nuclear deterrence aligns with Kojève’s existential reading of the Master-Slave dialectic: the master’s identity depends on the slave’s recognition, just as the credibility of a nation’s nuclear posture depends on the adversary’s acknowledgement of its willingness and capacity to retaliate. However, this precarious balance also breeds a deep-seated insecurity. A constant need for recognition requires equally constant displays of power — missile tests, military exercises, and rhetorical escalations — further entrenching the cycle of competition.
So if the development of nuclear weapons can be adequately explained by the march of technique and the actions of nations states be modelled as the struggle between masters, what then are the future developments of nuclear technology, and what impact has it made or will it make on human society or man in microcosm? In the event of catastrophic and cataclysmic nuclear war, a total war, that risks the extermination of the human species, the progress and continuity of history ends absolutely. Technical and industrial society will have destroyed itself and any future developments we might be interested in. We are then only interested in the existential dread that unemployment of nuclear weapons brings to people, or the effects of a limited nuclear war. A limited nuclear war is either the same as a total nuclear war, for the victims, or not too dissimilar as nuclear testing or a conventional war for those who survive. A limited war is mostly different in the restrain of the absolutist monarch, to use the language of Scarry1. The subjects of the nation state have no say in whether a total or limited nuclear war is waged. For these reasons, it is mostly of interest to analyse the dread of potential employment.
The state that backs down becomes the slave. And since the slave is no longer obsessed with this struggle for recognition in the nuclear arms race his now submissive population is terrified by their incapacity to fight against the adversary; The are struck by the fear of death that made them back down to begin with. It is this fear that Jaspers describes as an enlightened fear17, a constant imposing fear, that will drive human development and society toward a future that can handle the prometheisches Gefälle18 of nuclear weapons. The enlightened fear Jaspers describes is not just an individual or collective apprehension; it is a force that reshapes the structure of civilization. This fear drives humanity to seek ways of containing its newfound power, not through transcendence but through regulation, negotiation, and a constant reëvaluation of the precarious systems it has built. Yet this enlightened fear has a dual nature: while it can motivate coöperation and the pursuit of stability, it also perpetuates anxiety, creating a society perpetually on edge, defined by its ability to annihilate itself. If humanity can control this fear without resorting to the shackles of technique it will get the chance to become free in a way never before seen, but it also risks falling further into its clutches. In this framework, humanity’s potential freedom hinges on its ability to navigate the tension between its mastery of destructive power and the enlightened fear that compels its restraint. Kojève’s dialectical struggle, paired with Jaspers’ notion of enlightened fear, reveals a profound paradox: the tools of annihilation that could spell humanity’s end also serve as the catalyst for a collective awakening to its fragility and interdependence. This awakening, however, is not a singular event but an ongoing process — a process combining between the fear of extinction and the aspiration for a more stable, coöperative world order.
This dynamic reflects broader existential questions about freedom and control. What the master-slave dialectic teaches us the nuclear age transforms into a global condition. Nations, like individuals, are caught in a perpetual state of self-definition, reliant on both the acknowledgement of their peers and the restraint of their adversaries. The enlightened fear becomes a paradoxical source of empowerment, as it fosters a new kind of freedom: the freedom to act responsibly within the constraints of mutual vulnerability. This is the core idea behind arms control, that stability within this shared vulnerability will cause both fear, the fear to act, and enough security that both sides can focus on other matters within this fear. This balance between fear and security is what makes arms control a crucial mechanism in the nuclear age. By fostering stability through mutual agreements, arms control seeks to institutionalize the enlightened fear, transforming it into a structured and predictable element of international relations16. This does not eliminate the fear but channels it into a framework where its intensity can be managed. Stability arises not from the absence of tension but from the creation of systems that make escalation less likely and ensure that even in moments of crisis, the costs of catastrophic action remain prohibitively high.
The interplay between fear, control, and power in the nuclear age brings into question not only humanity’s technological and political evolution but also its moral and philosophical trajectory. The existential implications of nuclear weapons extend beyond the realm of international relations and into the core of human identity, autonomy, and survival. Nuclear deterrence, while maintaining an uneasy peace, amplifies humanity’s existential tension. The omnipresence of annihilation redefines freedom — not as liberation from constraint but as the capacity to exercise restraint in the face of overwhelming power. This reframing challenges the Enlightenment and technical ideal of progress, which envisioned technological advancement as a pathway to emancipation. Instead, nuclear weapons exemplify technique in that they shackle humanity to the perpetual threat of its own destruction. This tension resonates with Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence19: the idea that humanity might be condemned to relive its choices endlessly unless it finds the courage to affirm them fully. The nuclear dilemma forces us to grapple with the ultimate recurrence — living perpetually under the shadow of weapons we have created but cannot fully control. The choice, then, is not between employment and non-employment but between continued existence within this precarious balance and a radical reïmagining of what human progress entails. It is this choice that compels Sartre to see nuclear weapons as a liberator, that the conscious choice of nuclear weapons requires us to “every day, every minute, […] consent to live”20. We choose to maintain our arsenal of weapons in order to be granted this enlightened and authentic fear. If this fear will be a constant necessity or not is unclear, the use of nuclear weapons may perhaps be transformed by a global superstate into a tool for something other than death21. The dominance of technique makes it unlikely to lead to the total elimination of nuclear explosives however.
Achieving such a reïmagining requires more than disarmament. It demands a cultural and philosophical shift — a collective recognition that humanity’s worth is not tied to its capacity for domination or destruction but to its ability to foster creativity, love, and goodness in the world. This transformation parallels the existentialist call for authenticity; In that we should strive to live as we are innately. But this can only be driven by Jaspers’ enlightened fear, mirroring Mencius’ need for education to act morally. Heidegger sees this as a crucial point of technique, that “Unless humanity makes an effort to reörient itself, it will not be able to find revealing and truth”22. The nuclear age, then, is not just a historical epoch but a crucible for defining what it means to be human. It forces us to confront the duality of our nature: our capacity for boundless creativity and our potential for unparalleled destruction. Whether humanity can transcend this duality — or whether it will succumb to the very forces it has unleashed — remains an open question. But the answer lies not in the weapons themselves but in the choices we make about how to live with, and ultimately move beyond, their shadow.
The nuclear age compels humanity to confront the duality of its existence — its unparalleled capacity for both destruction and creation. The challenge is not merely technological or political but profoundly existential: to reïmagine progress and security in a way that transcends the pursuit of power and embraces a vision of collective flourishing. This transformation demands a conscious reckoning with the ethical responsibilities of wielding such destructive potential and a commitment to embedding restraint and cooperation at the core of global civilization. Ultimately, the legacy of nuclear weapons will be defined not by their use or disuse but by the choices humanity makes in their presence. These choices reflect the broader question of what it means to be human in an age where the tools of annihilation coëxist with the potential for boundless creativity. Whether we succumb to the nihilism caused by our inventions or rise to the challenge of building a new world remains an open question, but the stakes could not be higher. The future of humanity hinges on its ability to live authentically and wholly under the shadow of this technical evolution.
Footnotes:
Elaine Scarry, “Thermonuclear Monarchy: Choosing Between Democracy and Doom”. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014.
Federation of American Scientists. “SSBN-726 Ohio-Class FBM Submarines.” Accessed 2024-09-10. https://web.archive.org/web/20240910141737/https://nuke.fas.org/guide/usa/slbm/ssbn-726.htm.
Günther Anders, “Burning Conscience”. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1959.
Jacques Ellul, “The Technological Society”. New York: Vintage Books, 1964.
Robert Oppenheimer, “Public Lecture by Robert Oppenheimer.” November 25, 1958. Accessed 2024-11-30. https://archive.org/details/public-lecture-by-robert-oppenheimer-11-25-1958.
Marc Trachtenberg, “Strategic Thought in America, 1952-1966”. Political Science Quarterly: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Tomas Schelling, “Arms and Influence”. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1966. 1-34. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt5vm52s.4
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “The War Trap”. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981. https://archive.org/details/wartrap0000buen/mode/2up.
The definition of the use of nuclear weapons is one that is not straightforward. Most nuclear weapon use has been either rhetorical (threats), or demonstrative (nuclear weapons testing). Both of these fall under the umbrella of “nuclear signalling”. The detonation of nuclear weapons on the population or military facilities of an enemy, like those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is one that I will in this text refer to as the employment of nuclear weapons. In this case \( Employment \subsetneq Use \).
Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.” Signs 12, no. 4 (1987): 687–718. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3174209.
Genesis 11:6
Alexandre Kojève, “Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit”. London: Cornell University Press, 1969.
Albert Camus, “The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays”. Translated by Justin O’Brien. New York: Vintage Books, 1942.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. “The Phenomenology of Spirit”. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
A reference to Thomas S. Power’s famous quote in response to a RAND counterforce strategy avoiding Soviet civilian targets:
Restraint? Why are you so concerned with saving their lives? The whole idea is to kill the bastards. At the end of the war if there are two Americans and one Russian left alive, we win!
Thomas Schelling, “The Future of Arms Control”. Operations Research 9, no. 5 (1961): 722–731. http://www.jstor.org/stable/166817.
Karl Jaspers, “The Future of Mankind”. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. https://archive.org/details/futureofmankind0000unse.
Günther Anders, “The Obsolescence of Man, Volume II: On the Destruction of Life in the Epoch of the Third Industrial Revolution”. Munich: C.H. Beck. 1980. https://files.libcom.org/files/ObsolescenceofManVol%20IIGunther%20Anders.pdf
Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Gay Science”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1882.
Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Aftermath of the War”. Oxford: Seagull Books. 2008. https://archive.org/details/aftermathofwarsi0000sart
The U.S. Department of Energy, “Executive Summary: Plowshare Program”. Accessed 2024-11-30. https://www.osti.gov/opennet/reports/plowshar.pdf
Martin Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik”. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1954. https://monoskop.org/images/2/27/Heidegger_Martin_1953_2000_Die_Frage_nach_der_Technik.pdf